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Whitman and the Form Complete -J. L. Duncan 
They talk of his "splendid animality." 
Well, he'd got it on the brain, if that's 
the place for animality. 
?D. H. Lawrence 
IN ONE OF WHITMAN'S late, retrospective letters, we find a quick 
distinction between the gist of his Leaves and of Emerson's pages: "L. of 
G.'s word is the body, including all, including intellect and soul; E's word is 
mind (or intellect or soul)" {Correspondence 70). By word Whitman means 
the nature of each author's essential tidings and imperatives, the notion of 
reality each authorizes, the sort of Logos each affirms: Whitman (accord 
ing to Whitman) offers us the inclusive body, Emerson the exclusive 
mind. 
At issue is the nature of self. Both writers assume (Whitman implies) 
that the self is a function of language, the word, and that like language the 
self is central, at the very heart of reality, of each and all. But the two 
writers differ as to the self's composition. In Nature, let us recall, Emerson 
says that one's own body, like every other, belongs to nature and hence to 
the NOT ME. His word, therefore 
? Whitman says ?amounts to con 
sciousness made manifest without being made flesh. Emerson is an ideal 
ist. Whitman, on the other hand, is a self-avowed pantheist. To him, the 
self negates in person the very distinction he uses in definition: just as a 
word necessarily and indivisibly includes meaning, so the body includes 
consciousness. From beginning (1855) to end (1892) Whitman declares 
himself to be the poet of the Body and of the Soul because they are the 
same. In the first Inscription to Leaves ("One's-Self I Sing"), he declares, 
"Not physiognomy alone nor brain alone is worthy for the Muse, I say the 
Form complete is worthier far" ?thus in a phrase he stakes his particular 
poetic claim. 
The identity of body and soul ?i.e., the Form complete ?is a claim 
Whitman never tires of working. It is, as he explains in the epigraph to 
Leaves, not only the primary theme of his volume, it is the basic principle 
of his verse: 
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Come, said my Soul, 
Such verses for my Body let us write (for we are one,) 
That should I after death invisibly return, 
Or, long, long hence, in other spheres, 
There to some group of mates the chants resuming, 
(Tallying Earth's soil, trees, winds, tumultuous waves,) 
Ever with pleas'd smile I may keep on, 
Ever and ever yet the verses owning ?as, first, I here and now, 
Signing for Soul and Body, set to them my name 
[signed] 
Walt Whitman 
The body includes the soul, the soul includes the body ?since they are 
one, the equation is reversible. But for poetry, as Whitman's soul tacitly 
recognizes, their identity is not simply given, like water's hydrogen and 
oxygen. One could?like Emerson, presumably?write verses for the 
mind in high disregard of the body. Hence Whitman's soul orders him, by 
way of invitation, to write verses specifically for the body. (For its body, 
to be exact.) 
But there are verses and there are verses, Whitman's soul implies. One 
could write verses for the body which remain essentially of the mind, 
verses in which form and content, medium and message, body and soul, 
are at odds with one another, the sort of disparity we see, for instance, in 
Whitman's other poem on Lincoln's death: "My Captain does not answer, 
his lips are pale and still, / My father does not feel my arms, he has no 
pulse nor will," and so forth. Such verses, being divided against them 
selves, noisily collapse into silence, and silence is the last thing Whitman's 
soul wants. It wants verses that it can resume chanting at any time, even 
after death, and at any place, even in other spheres, and that it can keep on 
chanting, forever pleased to acknowledge them as its own. Such verses it 
wants, verses that realize in their very structure the Form complete, the 
innate identity of body and soul that they are all about. For without such 
verses, it seems to assume, it will have to spend the rest of its life in ab 
sence, silence, oblivion. Whitman's soul brings to mind the wonderful 
paradox pronounced by Wallace Stevens' "Peter Quince at the Clavier": 
Beauty in the mind is mortal, 
The fitful tracing of a portal; 
But in the flesh it is immortal. 
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Whitman's soul wants flesh so it may enjoy eternal life. 
In case Whitman should wonder how they are to write such verses?in 
case he should wonder what such verses will look like, sound like, feel 
like ?the soul informs him, parenthetically, that they will tally natural 
phenomena, soil, trees, wind, waves, and the like. The soul's body is vast 
? 
it includes the earth. Tally is an idiom of Whitman's. It means to record, 
to count, to label ?that is, to take note of something by enumerating or 
naming. It also has an archaic meaning that Whitman revives, to make 
two things agree or correspond. Writing verses for the soul's body then 
involves naming, part by part, the multitudinous earth and thus bringing 
body and soul together, where they belong. The poet is the Namer, Emer 
son says ("The Poet"), and no one has agreed more emphatically than 
Walt Whitman. But their concept of naming has its complications. The 
toddler's recitation ?dirt, tree, wind, water?may be pure poetry in 
theory, and even in truth, but it falls short in practical reality. No group of 
mates would listen to such a chant for long, and no mature soul worth its 
salt would be particularly pleased to own it. Moreover, in ordinary con 
versation we name things all the time without making essential agree 
ments between body and soul, or at least without being aware of making 
them. That is the kind of awareness begotten by poetry, the extraordinary 
use of language in which (and by which) matter and mind engagingly 
meet. That is why Whitman's soul demands that they write verses, not 
make small talk. But his soul does not explain how their verses are to tally 
nature and unify body and soul; it only asserts they should. The question 
thus remains: what will a poem that meets the soul's demands be like? 
As he implies in one of his titles ?"Song of the Answerer" ?Whitman 
thinks of poems as answers. And (accordingly) while the epigraph may 
seem 
only to raise questions, it also offers answers, not in any statement, 
but in its very form. It is, in one important respect at least, precisely such a 
poem as the soul demands. It is verse, i.e., it is language that turns, and it 
turns 
specifically in, back upon itself. The meaning of Whitman's epigraph 
centers in its own formation: in depicting the soul's demand that they 
write verses for the body together, he shows us that they are in fact 
writing verses together, making this particular body, the epigraph. Being 
about itself, the poem's form and content, its body and soul, are the same. 
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To go forward, as Theodore Roethke says in "Open Letter," we often 
must first go back. In a famous letter to William Godwin, Coleridge de 
clares, "I would endeavor to destroy the old antithesis of Words and 
Things, elevating, as it were, words into Things, and living Things too" 
(626). In "The Poet" Emerson makes the same endeavor, though he 
changes the equation to words and actions. I recall Frost making the same 
point somewhere by saying that poems are acts, not reports. They are not 
collections of words about things, but are things in their own right, and 
living things too. In "Ars Po?tica" Archibald MacLeish sums up this en 
deavor in a series of prescriptive couplets, two of which are so familiar 
they have all the power and comfort of clich?: 
A poem should be palpable and mute 
As a globed fruit 
A poem should not mean 
But be. 
But words have a habit, even in the best-behaved of poems, of making 
themselves heard as well as seen, and of pointing (whether they are actu 
ally pointing at anything or not), and of insisting on being meaningful. 
Frost's 
"Mending Wall," for instance, seems to refer to two men mending 
their wall, and it makes their activity mean a great deal. It is easy to forget 
that the fictitious men and the actual meaning are elements of the poem's 
process, that the poem is not about them but is made up (in part) of them. 
The poem seems like a report even though it is actually (if Frost is right) an 
exercise in and of pure being. The process of the poem paradoxically di 
verts our attention away from the poem's true ontology. 
Now one way a poet can direct our attention to a poem's true ontol 
ogy?which is also a way of realizing its ontology?is to turn the poem in 
upon itself. The poet can make certain that his words are acts of pure being 
by having them explicitly point at themselves, by making their meaning 
their own activity, as Whitman does in the epigraph and consistently 
thereafter. Leaves of Grass is essentially a self-reflexive work: it calls atten 
tion to itself as both the subject and the object of its own action. 
Because the self-reflexive form calls attention to itself, it has proven es 
pecially useful to writers who think art ought to be impersonal, as empty 
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of the author's singular self as nirvana. We may wonder if the ideal of self 
lessness is aesthetically practicable, if it is not in fact a necessary contradic 
tion, since those writers who insist on it most?writers like Flaubert, 
Eliot, Joyce ?usually have such singular, distinctive styles. The style is the 
man, signed, sealed, and delivered, and few men have written themselves 
larger. 
In the case of Whitman's self-reflexive verses, however, we have no ap 
parent contradiction to fret about, for their primary purpose in life is ?as 
he explains in "A Backward Glance O'er Travel'd Roads": 
to articulate and faithfully express my own physical, emotional, 
moral, intellectual, and aesthetic Personality, in the midst of, and 
tallying, the momentous spirit and facts of its immediate days, and of 
current America. 
By writing verses together for the body, the soul and the poet become a 
body of verse, one voice indivisible. The logic is circular: they realize an 
identity given from the start. By implication, then, the identity they real 
ize is authentic, true. But they realize it, we must add, in a form of human 
making, in poetry. Instead of an identity of two ?body and soul ?we 
have an identity of three: body, soul, and person. Identity thereby be 
comes Personality, and hence Whitman signs for body and soul not only 
in his name, but in his very hand. The poet is the namer, and Whitman 
names himself. The poet is the answerer, and Whitman answers our per 
petual desire for a sign with the literal sign of himself, his signature. 
We must remember, though, that a poem, particularly a self-reflexive 
poem, is an act, not a report. "Whoever you are holding me now in 
hand," Whitman says, relating us to him not through the text but in the 
text, face-to-face, hand-in-hand. His words do not refer to a person who, 
one December day in 1874, in Camden, New Jersey, signed for soul and 
body. Of course the poet may have been referring to himself in person, 
denying the conventional distinction between author and work, as Paul 
Zweig argues (16). In a letter to Emerson, a contemporary of Whitman's, 
Moncure Conway, declared the same identity: "He is clearly his Book" 
(Hindus, 30). But not any more. He is gone ?the way of all flesh ?so 
now, whatever Whitman intended, the words compose a voice that goes 
by the name of the poet, not a person but a Personality who signs here and 
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now, in the poem's timeless ubiquity. Soul and body, self and verse, poet 
and poem are one. 
But a poem is not a self-composed still-life; it is, to repeat, an act, and 
the first inscription (which immediately follows the epigraph) is an act 
typical of Whitman: 
One's-Self I sing, a simple separate person, 
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-Masse. 
Of Physiology from top to toe I sing, 
Not physiognomy alone nor brain alone is worthy for the 
Muse; I say the Form complete is worthier far, 
The Female equally with the Male I sing. 
Of Life immense in passion, pulse, and power, 
Cheerful, for the freest action form'd under the laws divine, 
The Modern Man I sing. 
Rather than simply singing his theme ?namely, himself?Whitman typi 
cally sings about himself singing his theme. To put it another way, his 
singing is the subject of his singing. He identifies himself as his verses 
? 
hence he exists in the eternal now of their present tense ?in two ways at 
once, as the self doing the singing, a separate person simple or not, and as 
the self the singing makes, the Modern Man. He does, by implication, 
what he is, and he is what he does?both at once?for being and becom 
ing, like soul and body, are one. The opening line of "Song of Myself 
" ? 
"I celebrate myself, and sing myself 
" ? 
makes the point explicit: he is the 
subject and the object of the verb, the singer and the sung. But who can 
tell the dancer from the dance? Subject and object join in song, and Whit 
man is the singing, a celebration that constitutes the Form complete, wor 
thy for the Muse. 
The Inscription is typical of Whitman's verse in another respect: it is 
basically an act of annunciation. He announces that his singing composes 
the subject of his singing. Of course poets have always made announce 
ments. "To you, Perses," Hesiod says, "I would describe the true way of 
existence," while Homer would sing of Achilles' wrath and Milton would 
justify the ways of God to men. But they make their announcements in 
the beginning, as a declaration of intent, a promise which, with the 
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Muses' help, they hope to fulfill. Then they get to work, as it were. Hes 
iod starts describing the true way, Homer and Milton plunge headlong in 
medias res. But their work, it should be noted, consists essentially of narra 
tion and argument. 
Whitman, on the other hand, rarely narrates, never argues. As C. Car 
roll Hollis observes (ch. Ill), Whitman's work consists essentially of lines 
in the present tense and the declarative mood, of announcements from be 
ginning? "One's-Self I sing" ?to end: "The Modern Man I sing." 
More than any other poet Whitman sings, he declares, he swears, he 
says: 
I am the poet of the woman the same as the man, 
And I say it is as great to be a woman as to be a man, 
And I say there is nothing greater than the mother of men . . . 
("Song of Myself") 
As large as he is (he contains multitudes), Whitman does not hesitate to 
make even larger declarations: 
And I say to any man or woman, Let your soul stand cool and 
composed before a million universes. 
And I say to mankind, Be not curious about God, 
For I who am curious about each am not curious about God . . . 
("Song of Myself") 
We should not be curious because he is not curious, he declares, grandly 
assuming that, just as he promised in the beginning, we shall assume what 
he assumes. "I swear I think now that every thing without exception has 
an eternal soul! ... I swear I think there is nothing but immortality!" 
("To Think of Time") No one has taken and applied more literally the 
principle that the poet is the say er. 
Because Whitman operates on the principle of annunciation, his verse 
characteristically makes a promise and makes good on the promise in the 
same breath. 
"Through me the afflatus surging and surging, through me 
the current and index," he says, and having said it moves on: "I speak the 
pass-word primeval, I give the sign of democracy" ("Song of Myself"). 
He does not, as we have seen, make a declaration then set about to dem 
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onstrate it. Rather, he makes a declaration that serves as its own demon 
stration, and he follows that up with another, and another. In announcing 
that through him the afflatus surges, the afflatus is in fact surging ?in 
spiration is at work. As far as demonstration is concerned, no more need 
be said. The line stands as a self-evident truth. In announcing that he 
speaks the word and gives the sign, he is actually speaking the word, liter 
ally giving the sign. In writing about the sort of verse his soul orders, he 
simultaneously fills the order and delivers the goods, including a tally of 
Earth's soil, trees, winds, tumultuous waves. 
Leaves 
of Grass's word, let us recall, is the inclusive body: "If I worship 
one thing more than another it shall be the spread of my own body, or any 
part of it," Whitman says ("Song of Myself "), and having said it, "shall 
be" becomes a fact, a truth present and accounted for simply because it has 
been pronounced. Why he should worship his body ?the complex ration 
ale?goes without saying, for Whitman is satisfied to recite his parts and 
concomitantly to tally Earth's: "Mix'd tussled hay of head, beard, brawn, 
it shall be you! / Trickling sap of maple, fibre of manly wheat, it shall be 
you!" And so on. The metaphors are elaborate, but their premise is simple 
and familiar: the body is of nature. Whitman's recitation is therefore as 
concrete as his soul could wish: it is innocent of the abstractions of argu 
ment, it specifies the parts, it fleshes them out with metaphors that are, as 
the phrase goes, down to earth. It makes his form and his worship com 
plete. 
At the same time, however, Whitman's recitation is curiously abstract. 
This abstract quality, moreover, is as characteristic of his verse as the body 
that his soul demands and that Whitman claims to deliver. "You sweaty 
brooks and dews it shall be you! / Winds whose soft tickling genitals rub 
against me it shall be you!" The metaphors are elaborate (and bold) 
enough to call attention to themselves as metaphors, as verbal structures in a 
verbal structure. They make us aware that words themselves, even the 
most mundane, are inescapably abstract: they are ideas in the flesh, the em 
bodiments of concepts. The self-reflexive structure of Leaves of Grass implies 
that the Leaves' actual word?Whitman's claim notwithstanding ?is not 
the body as such, but, to paraphrase the epigraph of this essay, the body on 
the brain. The actual word is consciousness, including all. For all their very 
real differences, Whitman is, in his fashion, no less an idealist than Emer 
son. 
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In the worshipful recitation of his parts, Whitman's metaphors, like his 
songs in general, make announcements of an essentially self-reflexive na 
ture. And by calling attention to themselves they invite comparison with 
metaphors from other eras and spheres, metaphors which, even when they 
have the same form, serve entirely different functions. 
For a long time in western culture, when truth was regarded as a matter 
of resemblance or correspondence between different orders of being, meta 
phor was regarded as both a means of discovery and a form of proof. Meta 
phors were (or could be) literally true, and everything was potentially 
metaphorical. Harvey's treatise on the circulation of the blood was accord 
ingly thought to have significant implications concerning the circulation 
of the earth's waters. Anatomy recapitulated geology, Sir Thomas Browne's 
microcosm reflected the macrocosm. Then, when truth came to be re 
garded as a matter of measurement, of the intangible quantified, metaphor 
was 
regarded, logically enough, as a form of illustration. It served by mak 
ing truth sensible, and like all good servants it was, though necessary, dis 
tinctly subordinate, predictably fitting and proper. James Thompson's 
brooks and dews were never sweaty, his zephyrs did not have genitals. 
The romantic revolt against neo-classicism involved a revival of the doc 
trine of correspondence and the restoration of metaphor to its former sta 
tion, but with a significant difference from former times. Truth was now 
regarded as a matter of consciousness in action, the process, human and di 
vine, of creation. Hence correspondence was relative and metaphor self 
conscious, as Whitman realized not only in principle but in structure as 
well. 
A child said What is the grass? fetching it to me with full hands; 
How could I answer the child? I do not know what it is any 
more than he. 
("Song of Myself") 
He answers anyway, by offering several "guesses" ?that it is the flag of his 
disposition, the handkerchief of the Lord, a child, a uniform hieroglyphic, 
the uncut hair of graves ?and each guess is as valid as the other, whether 
any are actually true or not. For by explicitly guessing, Whitman shifts 
the issue of validity from the correspondences themselves to the act of cor 
responding. 
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Later ?and with far greater certainty ?he declares, "Walt Whitman, a 
kosmos, of Manhattan the son," and the metaphor performs wonders. It 
makes the old distinction between micro- and macrocosm utterly rela 
tive?he is a cosmos, as if there is more than one (the word has no plural) 
and as if they are all of a size ?and it strikes the humorous self-conscious 
pomp and strut of hyperbole. ("Earth! you seem to look for something at 
my hands, / Say, old top-knot, what do you want?") He is a cosmos in a 
manner of speaking. His sweat may run in streams, he may have title to 
broad muscular fields, but the resemblances do not pretend to be veritable 
correspondences, any more than the fanciful resemblances Thoreau draws 
out between geological formations and the human face: "The nose is a 
manifest congealed drop or stalactite. The chin is a still larger drop, the 
confluent dripping of the face" ("Spring," Waiden). Whitman's figures, 
like Thoreau's, are possessed by the excited air of discovery and proof, but 
we must understand that what they are discovering and proving is their 
own imaginative vitality. They celebrate their own success in making 
original juxtapositions and thereby generating fresh meaning, in creating 
this new and marvelous and living thing right before our eyes, in partici 
pating in what Owen Barfield regards as the very essence of the poetic, 
"the springs and freshets of Becoming" (132). Hence their excitement. 
But hence too the way these texts call attention to themselves as verbal 
constructs, figures of speech. In Whitman's case this attention-getting be 
havior is peculiarly fitting and proper because he is himself a figure of 
speech, a manner of speaking, a voice singing itself into being as it goes. 
"The Maker of this earth but patented a leaf," says Thoreau ("Spring," 
Waiden), and Whitman operates (far more literally than Thoreau) on the 
same principle, creating page by page, year by year, his Leaves of Grass, a 
cosmos that embodies consciousness in action, human and divine. "We are 
symbols," says Emerson, "and inhabit symbols" ("The Poet"), and Whit 
man shows us what he means. For as Charles Feidelson has explained, 
"The T of Whitman's poems speaks the world that he sees, and sees the 
world that he speaks, and does this by becoming the reality of his vision and 
of his words, in which the reader also participates" (18). 
The critical consensus is that the reality Whitman speaks is of the body, 
for the body, and by the body, just as he claims. His catalogs are the crucial 
case in point. According to one of Whitman's acutest critics, James E. 
Miller, the catalogs amount to "an ecstatic and extended engagement 
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with ?delight in ?the physicality of the universe"(46). They presumably 
lead us not into the highly complex and tempting structure of con 
sciousness and symbol, but directly to the things of this world, concrete 
facts and events, as the following recitation, innocent of figure, plain as 
pavement, should demonstrate: 
The pure contralto sings in the organ loft, 
The carpenter dresses his plank, the tongue of his foreplane 
whistles its wild ascending lisp, 
The married and unmarried children ride home to their 
Thanksgiving dinner, 
The pilot seizes the kingpin, he heaves down with a strong arm, 
The mate stands braced in the whale-boat, lance and harpoon are 
ready, 
The duck-shooter walks by silent and cautious stretches, 
The deacons are ordain'd with cross'd hands at the altar, 
The spinning girl retreats and advances to the hum of the big 
wheel . . . 
and so on ("Song of Myself"). 
We may not actually be born story-tellers, but it seems we are, and we 
customarily tell our stories in the past tense (or, if the language provides 
it, in a specifically narrative tense). Hence it is that of all the sorts of order 
possible in a literary work, the one that calls the least attention to itself is 
the narrative. Even when the sequence involves the complication of cause 
and-effect, it is unobtrusive. Change the formula only a little?just put 
the narration in the present tense, for example, or in the second person 
? 
and the reader immediately becomes aware not only of the story being 
told, but of the telling itself. 
Now the events in Whitman's catalogue may have an order, but it is 
not narrative. They do not constitute even a simple sequence in time, 
much less of cause-and-effect. Instead, all of these events are occurring si 
multaneously, now, and they are beyond the ken of a single empirical 
point of view. "I am afoot with my vision," Whitman declares, but he 
does not mean he can literally see the contralto in the loft and then four 
lines and five seconds later the mate in the whale-boat. It is doubtful, in 
fact, that Whitman ever saw a mate braced in a whale-boat, but we do not 
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really care, for we know that he does not mean physical vision at all. 
Whitman indeed speaks the world that he sees, but he sees primarily 
with his mind's eye. The "air of immediacy" that David Cavitch cites (51) 
is not of the world that the person Whitman ate and slept in, but of the 
world that the Personality Whitman imagines, images forth. (And thus it 
is that he speaks the world he sees.) Of course all writers image forth 
worlds, but there are differences. Thoreau, for instance, however elabo 
rately he spins a fancy, always begins with and remains faithful to his par 
ticular empirical point of view, to physical facts he actually witnessed. As 
high as he soars, he keeps his feet on the ground. Whitman, on the other 
hand, cuts completely loose ?"My ties and ballast leave me, my elbows 
rest in sea-gaps, / I skirt sierras, my palms cover continents" ?and as a 
consequence his speaking, even at its simplest and most concrete, does not 
even feign to lead us directly to the things of this world, to deliver us em 
pirical reality, the world of common sense. 
For Whitman's vision amounts, essentially, to a reverie, and in a rev 
erie, as Gaston Bachelard has written, "The whole being of the world is 
amassed poetically around the cogito of the dreamer" (162). Hence it is that 
Whitman's cosmos resembles the ancient cosmologies that Bachelard has 
described as "audacious reveries" (177). Hence it is that the world Whit 
man envisions and speaks comes across as abstract, remote from the physi 
cal, because it makes us stop and contemplate its own processes, to ponder 
the nature of its order, to wonder just what sort of mind it is that puts 
duck-shooters, deacons, and spinning girls, all of them independently 
minding their own business, side-by-side without transition, explanation, 
or 
apology. 
We all agree, I think, that the basic principle informing Whitman's 
catalogs is psychological association, or as William James was to call it, 
stream-of-consciousness. But we must recognize that the current ofthat 
stream, as the very phrase implies, carries us away from the physical to the 
mental. It floats us not among things, but in a consciousness of things. To 
tally earth's soil, trees, winds, and waves, therefore, means in effect to 
transform the material into the ideal, to transubstantiate body into soul. 
Thus they are one. Thus is the form complete. 
It can be argued that while I am assuming reality comes in pairs ?subject 
and object, mind and matter, and the like?Whitman himself makes real 
ity a matter of one: 
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The early lilacs became part of this child, 
And grass and white and red morning-glories, and white and red 
clover, and the song of the phoebe bird, 
... all became part of him. 
("There Was a Child Went Forth") 
And simultaneously, Whitman declares, the child became them. As his 
soul says, the two are one. But as Howard Waskow has pointed out 
(20-1), as often and as emphatically as Whitman insists on the identity of 
body and soul, he also insists on the distinction between body and soul. 
And it is not a merely theoretical distinction, the sort that any monist 
must use in order to make his singular point, the sort that seems to be built 
into the very structure of the language and that is necessary for thinking 
about reality even though it may not obtain in reality. It is a distinction 
Whitman affirms. For rarely do the things he sees (including those he sees 
only with his mind's eye) simply become part of him. Rather, he is usually 
aware of himself seeing them, acutely conscious of them becoming part of 
him: "And such as it is to be of these I more or less am, / And of these one 
and all I weave the song of myself." He is so aware, in fact, that he makes 
the process a matter of degree, of more or less, something he calculates and 
measures, just as he now self-consciously makes it not just part of his song, 
but of his very singing. 
It is a distinction built into the very structure of his verse, into his self 
reflexive form: "I celebrate myself, and sing myself." He offers us an iden 
tity of poet and poem, an identity that is simultaneously self-composed 
and self-composing. Thus he offers himself to us immediately, and in 
volves us (as Feidelson points out) in his process: just as he becomes the 
things he sees and they become him, so we become the poem in hand and 
it becomes us. But we must notice that by explicitly involving us in his 
verse?by pointing out, for instance, that what he assumes we shall as 
sume, and that we are holding him now in hand ?he calls our attention to 
what we are doing. Instead of simply reading his verse, or becoming one 
with it, of becoming absorbed, as we say, and staying there, we also be 
come self-conscious, aware of what we are doing, and thus of ourselves as 
apart from the verse. He puts us in the same divided frame of mind that he 
celebrates in himself: 
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Apart from the pulling and hauling stands what I am, 
Stands amused, complacent, compassionating, idle, unitary, 
Looks down, is erect, or bends an arm on an impalpable certain 
rest, 
Looking with side-curved head curious what will come next, 
Both in and out of the game and watching and wondering at it. 
("Song of Myself") 
And so, as he makes certain, we relate to the push and haul of his verse, 
both a part of it and apart from it. Thus Whitman proves by structure 
what he assumes in principle, and thus again he makes us assume what he 
assumes, that the what I am, the Me Myself as he later calls it, is, like his 
verses, indeed like reality itself as he conceives it, essentially a matter of 
consciousness. 
Over and over again Whitman defines his major task as two-fold and 
paradoxical: to sing the simple separate person, and to utter the words 
democratic, en-masse. He celebrates both the singular self and society, 
both uniqueness and alikeness. That paradox is obvious, but it entails a 
couple of others not so obvious. The self Whitman sings, the nineteenth 
century American Personality he puts on the record, is singularly spare of 
personal particularity. It is of Manhattan, it enjoys riding the Brooklyn 
Ferry, it was once a child that went (and still goes) very generally forth 
and that heard a mocking bird one night, it once saw somewhere or other 
in Louisiana a live-oak growing, it once passed through an unnamed 
populous city but now only remembers some unspecified woman (or, ac 
cording to the manuscript, some unspecified man) and their nights and 
days of love?a few facts, if facts they are, ofthat general sort. As Richard 
Chase reminds us (76-7), the personality of Whitman's Leaves is im 
mensely impersonal, abstract. If we define the self as consciousness em 
bodied, we must say that the body of Whitman's self?afoot with its vi 
sion, skirting Sierras and continents ?is stretched thin to the vanishing 
point. 
The second paradox logically follows: the society Whitman celebrates, 
the love of women and comrades, is equally impersonal, abstract. Now in 
sofar as Whitman is concerned with social/political structure, with De 
mocracy, such abstraction is inevitable. The relationship we enjoy (or de 
spise, as the case may be) with our fellow man cannot be personal. But as 
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we see in both the Children of Adam and the Calamus poems, the sorts of 
relationships that are usually personal ?sex and camaraderie ?are as ab 
stract as Democracy itself, as impersonal as lust. "I am he that aches with 
amorous love," he says, not with desire for somebody in particular, but 
for anybody in general, for as he goes on to say, all matter attracts. His 
comrades are consistently featureless, often taking the form of "you," the 
abstract reader. 
Emerson declares that 
"Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of 
your own mind" ("Self-Reliance"). Whitman declares that "If anything is 
sacred the human body is sacred" ("I Sing the Body Electric"). Thus the 
difference between the two may seem to be as complete as Whitman 
claims. But "the human body" is no more tangible and no less ideal than 
"the mind." We experience bodies or a body, not the body, just as we see 
an 
apple falling, not gravity. Strictly speaking, then, Whitman and his 
soul write verses celebrating the idea of camaraderie, the idea of sex, the 
idea of body, a point that Anne Gilchrist missed to Whitman's dismay. 
Mrs. Gilchrist (the widow of Blake's first biographer) thought that 
Whitman's verses meant body in the flesh, the self in person, and she re 
sponded in kind, offering him her body, her person. "Real effects," she 
wittily explained, "imply real causes." Whitman corrected her: 
You must not construct such an unauthorized and imaginary figure 
and call it W.W., and so devotedly invest your loving nature in it. 
The actual W. W. is a very plain personage and entirely unworthy of 
such devotion. (Allen 440) 
But of course it was Whitman himself who constructed (and thus author 
ized) the imaginary figure that aroused her ?in his verses. As he described 
himself in one of his self-promoting reviews, 
One of the roughs, large, proud, affectionate, eating,drinking, and 
breeding, his costume manly and free, his face sunburnt and bearded, 
his postures strong and erect, his voice bringing hope and prophecy 
to the generous faces of young and old. (In Re Walt Whitman, 13) 
This reads like a personal ad for The New York Review of Books 
? it's too 
good to be true?because Whitman is imagining what M. Wynn Thomas 
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calls "an exemplary life" (278), a Personality that is as ideal in its way as 
classical sculpture. To be sure, as an ideal it is supposed to be true in a nor 
mative sense: this is what a real man should be, Whitman indirectly says, 
and would be if the flesh were able. And as Zweig points out, Whitman 
tried himself to realize his ideal in his own flesh. But he knew there was a 
difference ?he knew, for example, that he was "breeding" metaphorically 
at best. Whitman's real point was not to offer himself the actual man, but 
to offer a new ideal of manhood and culture, and to suggest that the ideal 
is true in a way the actual never can be. 
In the context of Whitman's verses, accordingly ?in the work of his 
imagination, the world he images forth ?the figure is not merely imag 
inary. It is the real toad in the imaginary garden, "the real I myself," as he 
says elsewhere, "An image, an eidolon" ("Eidolons"). When therefore he 
says "Who touches this touches a man" ("So Long!"), he means a real 
man, an image, an authorized ideal. By mistaking the ideal figure for the 
plain actual personage, Mrs. Gilchrist inadvertently unauthorized it, mak 
ing it merely imaginary. 
The flesh cannot bear too much reality, not even the poet's body of 
verse: 
Do you suppose yourself advancing on real ground toward a real 
heroic man? 
Have you no thought O dreamer that it may be all maya, illu 
sion? 
("Are You the New Person Drawn toward Me?") 
Hence the identity of self and song that Whitman celebrates is com 
plete?touch one and by definition you touch the other ?but temporary, 
lasting only as long as the poem does: 
I depart as air, I shake my white locks at the runaway sun, 
I effuse my flesh in eddies, and drift it in lacy jags. 
I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, 
If you want me again look for me under your boot-soles. 
You will hardly know who I am or what I mean, 
But I shall be good health to you nevertheless, 
And filter and fibre your blood. 
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Failing to fetch me at first: keep encouraged, 
Missing me one place search another, 
I stop somewhere waiting for you. 
("Song of Myself") 
In other words, the identity he expresses, the eidolon he calls the Me 
Myself, survives its particular expression. It is an image we carry around 
with us, consciously and unconsciously, long after we put the book down, 
long after we have forgotten, except for a few phrases, the words and lines 
of its composition. ("The words of my book nothing, the drift of it every 
thing"-"Shut Not Your Doors.") 
Thus Whitman's identity is, just as he says, both in the game?in the 
verse, the lines and words ?and out. It is in me, filtering and fibering my 
blood, and it is out of me, in you, and you. It is, like any other idea, in the 
world, in the air we breathe, in the very ground we stand on. (For the idea 
of Whitman can make a great difference in the way we construe such 
things as air and dirt and grass.) But like any other idea, Whitman's eido 
lon is also out of the world, beyond space and time, waiting immutably 
for us somewhere or other, anywhere, everywhere, nowhere, if we should 
want it again. Finding it, however, will not mean understanding Whit 
man. Identity is not a subject matter that is intelligible, apart; it is a sub 
ject matter as such, the divine tautology "I am that I am," the mystery of 
being in form. Finding Whitman will mean, therefore, engaging in a vital 
relationship with him, intimately enjoying his mystery, much the way we 
enjoy friends and lovers. Hence he will be good health to us. 
But of course the W. W. ofLeaves of Grass is not exactly the same as actual 
friends and lovers, as the actual W. W. finally got Mrs. Gilchrist to under 
stand. The Whitman who waits for us is a function of language self-con 
sciously wrought, of self-reflexive verse. And it is the self-reflexive struc 
ture that explains why the poet regarded his Leaves retrospectively as pri 
marily a language experiment, and why he said prospectively, in the 1855 
Preface, that "the expression of the American poet is to be transcendent 
and new. It is to be indirect and not direct or descriptive or epic." Instead 
of singing directly about himself (like Wordsworth, for example, in The 
Prelude), he sings about himself singing himself into being. Instead of di 
rectly reporting a perception or arguing a thesis or telling a story about 
116 
himself and the world he lives in ?instead of being descriptive or epic ?he 
sings about himself saying, like God, Let there be, and assuming that it is 
simultaneously there ?light, heavens, waters, earth, a cosmos in his own 
image, himself in the image of a cosmos. 
In the beginning?which is always now ?is the Word, and the Word, 
according to Heidegger, is logos: "It speaks simultaneously as the name 
for Being and for Saying," for Being, in a way we can never fully under 
stand, requires Saying. "Saying . . . lets beings appear in their 'it is'" (80). 
Moreover, the Word according to Whitman is with the self and is the self: 
"Each man to himself and each woman to herself, is the word of the past 
and present, and the true word of immortality ..." ("A Song of the Roll 
ing Earth"). This is the self that he realizes and demonstrates in his own 
creation, the self that waits for us. Hence the poet's expression, as Heideg 
ger helps us to see, is transcendent, and hence too the poet-self that is ex 
pressed is transcendent, justifying Whitman's promise, "Stop this day and 
night with me and you shall possess the origin of all poems," and not just 
poems but also, as he goes on to say, "the good of the earth and sun . . . ." 
We shall enjoy, as Emerson urges in Nature, an original relation with the 
universe, for all creation, from the microcosm to the macrocosm, is a kind 
of poem, the primal and ceaseless expression of consciousness. 
"A song of the rolling earth, and of words according," Whitman an 
nounces, and he means of course his song now underway about the earth 
and about words that accord with it, that harmonize, tally. But the word 
accord also means to grant, to bestow upon: he will, accordingly, sing 
about the words that bring the earth as we know it into being, that grant 
its reality. But Whitman's announcement also means that this is the 
earth's song of itself, that words (and thus poetry) are not other than and 
about the earth, but are of it, integral and innate, that earth and language 
are functions of one another. Together, by implication, they compose the 
poem we call reality. 
Simultaneously, though, the announcement makes us wonder what the 
nature of that poem really is, as Whitman anticipates. That is why he im 
mediately follows the announcement with a quick catechism on transcen 
dental linguistics: 
Were you thinking that those were the words, those upright 
lines? Those curves, angles, dots? 
117 
No, those are not the words, the substantial words are in the 
ground and sea, 
They are in the air, they are in you. 
Were you thinking that those were the words, those delicious 
sounds out of your friends' mouths? 
No, the real words are more delicious than they. 
We should not identify the real words with their mere symbols, the 
sounds we articulate, the marks we make. We should not confuse their 
true substance with their merely physical manifestation, speech and 
writing. The real words, perforce, must be the meanings of the symbols. 
They have the true substance of the ideal. Hence they are in us, the matters 
and affairs of consciousness. 
But just because they are in us does not mean that they are ideas about 
(and are therefore apart from) the things they denominate. Rather, says 
Whitman, they are in the things they denominate, in ground and sea and 
air, and thus he seems to fill William Carlos Williams' prescription, "No 
ideas but in things" ("A Sort of a Song"). But he quickly goes Williams a 
step further, asserting that words are not just in the things they denomi 
nate, they actually are those things: "Air, soil, water, fire ?those are 
words, / I myself am a word with them ?my qualities interpenetrate 
with theirs. . . ." Words made up the body of the old world: composed by 
consciousness, by the human I am, the four elements and their cognates 
the four humors (air/blood, soil/black bile, water/phlegm, fire/yellow 
bile) included all, the physical, the physiological, the psychological. And 
so, by implication, words make up the ever-changing new world of post 
Renaissance physics and chemistry and psychology. 
According to a line by Stefan George that Heidegger loves to quote, 
"Where word breaks off, no thing may be." Without a word a thing is 
not a thing, it is a dumb show of the senses, a blank in the mind's eye. It 
has no identity. And the same thing is true, as Whitman points out, of 
human identity: he himself is a word among all the other words that make 
up his world. But he immediately reminds us that we should not confuse 
the word, the real word, with its symbol: "my name is nothing to 
them, / Though it were told in the three thousand languages, what 
would air, soil, water, fire know of my name?" The real or true words of 
118 
the earth are "inaudible," they are "untransmissable by print," they are 
"the unspoken meanings of the earth," and they are unspoken because 
they are unspeakable. The true word, then, is the unnameable source of 
both name and thing. It is the pure idea. Thus it is that while Whitman 
seems to fill Williams' prescription, he actually stands it on its head: "No 
things but in ideas." 
The song of the rolling earth is a perfect poem because it is composed, 
not of names, but of true words: 
To her children the words of the eloquent dumb great mother 
never fail, 
The true words do not fail, for motion does not fail and reflection 
does not fail, 
Also the day and night do not fail, and the voyage we pursue 
does not fail. 
The earth's poem has two basic attributes, motion and reflection. By re 
flection Whitman means self-reflection, for a few lines later he imagines 
the earth 
"Holding a mirror day and night tirelessly before her own face." 
Like God, she creates by contemplating herself, and she is her own crea 
tion, a composer whose true words make up herself (and of whom, let us 
recall, we, as true words ourselves, are parts). By reflection Whitman also 
means indirection?we see not the true words themselves (they are invis 
ible) but their faithful reflection in phenomena, in the things whose exist 
ence 
unfailingly bears witness to the reality of ideas, "the unspoken mean 
ings of the earth." 
The other attribute of this perfect poem that we have named earth is 
motion. "The divine ship sails the divine sea" through space and time 
(both day and night), not in order to get anywhere but for the sake of the 
going, of pure motion per se. Indeed, the idea of a destination for such a 
voyage, of a purpose or goal, is vulgar and contradictory: it implies an 
end, as if the divine voyage were merely a means. It also implies an ending, 
closing up shop, cosmic shutdown, a failure in the works. But the earth's 
motion is unfailing, absolute. The perfect poem, the poem with the form 
complete, does not consist of beginning, middle, and end. Rather it is 
endless, always in the middle of beginning, in the midst of now. In the be 
ginning is the Word. 
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Human poems, on the contrary, consist of beginning, middle, and end. 
They are composed of names, of written and audible words rather than the 
"true words" that make up the earth. The poet is the Namer, but names 
cannot "tell" the "best of the earth," its "unspoken meaning" and 
"truths." They cannot put their fingers on the point they would make, 
much less compute its value. Whenever he attempts to tell the best, Whit 
man says, he becomes utterly inarticulate, dumb. 
But lest poets find this inherent shortcoming cause for despair, Whit 
man swears at the same time that it is actually better "to leave the best un 
told," and that "The best of the earth cannot be told anyhow, all or any is 
best," and in the last section of the poem he exhorts poets to keep writing 
poems with the faith that he now swears by, "That faith that leaves the 
best untold." Their work, he promises, "will certainly come in use," and 
they themselves will certainly be remembered, understood, justified, and 
glorified in and by the "architects" who are certain to appear when, ac 
cording to Whitman, "the materials are all prepared and ready." The ar 
chitects, I presume, are those who will house humankind in some grand 
synthesis now beyond human ken, and the poet's words, however inade 
quate they now are, will prove indispensable to that synthesis. 
Thus in offering consolation and encouragement to poets, Whitman 
does not slight the disparity between their efforts and the incomparable ac 
complishment of the earth. Human song is finite in form. And self-re 
flexive though it may be, nevertheless it is not self-contained. Instead it is a 
means to and end beyond itself, and it is referential, pointing at the true 
words of the earth, the ideas that constitute reality. 
For his labors, though, the poet needs quicker returns than some re 
mote future justification, and Whitman offers a few. "All merges toward 
the presentation of the unspoken meanings of the earth," and the presenta 
tion takes place specifically for the poet who (like Whitman, naturally) 
"sings the songs of the body and of the truths of the earth." The process is 
circular?by singing of the truths the poet shall be presented those 
truths?but not merely tautological. Whitman means that by seeking the 
poet finds, by knocking he gets to enter that which he cannot tell but 
which he can participate in, namely, "the best of the earth." That partici 
pation, which also goes by the names of becoming and enlightenment, 
does not change anything, Whitman points out: 
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Things are not dismiss'd from the places they held before, 
The earth is just as positive and direct as it was before, 
Facts, religions, improvements, politics, trades, are as real as 
before. 
Even so, he goes on to indicate, participating in the best makes all the 
difference: 
But the soul is also real, it too is positive and direct, 
No reasoning, no proof has establish'd it, 
Undeniable growth has establish'd it. 
The best of the earth is, in a word, the soul, and one of the best sorts of 
growth to establish it is the motion of poetry. 
Poetry is, let us recall, the soul's idea in the first place ("Come, said my 
Soul . . 
."), and while it may be written for the body, it is an exercise of 
the soul, the purpose of which is to manifest or establish the soul. For 
poetry is part of the "all" that "merges toward the presentation of the un 
spoken meanings of the earth": Whitman's song of the earth is part of the 
earth's song of itself, typically enough. His verse ?the self-reflexive verse 
of consciousness in process, in motion ?reflects, however partially, the 
perfect motion and reflection of the song of the earth. It is a contributing 
factor, as the phrase goes, to the earth's perfection. 
When Whitman announces the Form complete as his theme, he does not 
claim that his Leaves actually constitute it, only that they celebrate it. The 
body of verse that his soul and he write 
? 
self-reflexive verse that unites 
body and soul ?remains in and of itself incomplete, a fact that finally 
causes Whitman frustration and satisfaction alike: 
O book, O chants! Must all then amount to but this? 
Must we barely arrive at the beginning of us? ?and yet it is 
enough, O soul; 
O soul, we have positively appear'd ?that is enough. 
("As the Time Draws Nigh") 
They have made their appearance, of course, in the body of their verse, and 
it has been a positive one: they have, after all, celebrated the form com 
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p?ete, and their appearance has real existence in and of itself. Here the book 
positively and indisputably is, in hand. And yet it is at the same time, para 
doxically enough, only an appearance, real, to be sure, but not entirely 
real, not absolutely quintessentially completely real. Even though they 
unite body and soul, his chants do not themselves compose the form com 
plete for the very simple reason that the body is not final. 
Beauty in the flesh may be immortal, but as Steven's Peter Quince im 
mediately goes on to say, 
The body dies; the body's beauty lives. 
So evenings die, in their green going, 
A wave, interminably flowing. 
Here Whitman's book indisputably is, yet as Whitman points out (and as 
we have already observed) we read the book through beginning, middle, 
end, then put it aside. We may pick it up again whenever and wherever 
we wish ?Whitman's soul may at any time and any place resume the 
chants, just as it wishes ?and yet the book remains finite in form. It is fin 
ished. But its beauty, which is to say its essential form ?the wave of Su 
sanna's green evening, the self of Whitman's singing ?survives its body's 
finishing: 
So I pass, a little time vocal, visible, contrary, 
Afterward a melodious echo, passionately bent for, (death making 
me 
really undying) 
The best of me then when no longer visible, for toward that I 
have been incessantly preparing. 
("So Long!") 
The best of him ?a melodious echo, the image of his song, the pure idea 
? 
survives his body's death not just as a memory but (by analogy) as an abso 
lute. For he will have / he now has undying life, an existence having its 
own 
reality, having indeed, as Whitman goes on to say, a greater reality 
than his appearance in flesh and song: 
An unknown sphere more real than I dream'd, more direct, darts 
awakening rays about me, So long! 
122 
Remember my words, I may again return, 
I love you, I depart from materials, 
I am as one disembodied, triumphant, dead. 
In comparison to the wide-awake absolute of death, this sphere (flesh and 
song) is but a dream, an apparition, a mere appearance, maya. It is a posi 
tive appearance because, as a process of self-definition, it is a passionate 
preparation for death, and it is enough because Whitman and his soul do 
get to die. And dying is "lucky" (as Whitman so happily puts it in "Song 
of Myself") because in the disembodiment of death they will enjoy the 
form complete, their undying identity, pure consciousness in pure reflec 
tion, pure motion, a divine ship on the divine waters: 
O my brave soul! 
O farther farther sail! 
O daring joy, but safe! are they not all the seas of God? 
O farther, farther, farther sail! 
("Passage to India") 
In "Scented Herbage of My Breast" Whitman discovers that he sings es 
sentially for death's sake, for death is "the real reality" beyond "this entire 
show of appearance." Death is reality absolute, the underlying eidolon. 
In the beginning is the Word, and in the beginning is the end. But the 
end is actually the beginning of endlessness. Hence it is that in "Out of the 
Cradle," Whitman, true to his vision, explicitly identifies the Word as 
death. Each of us is, according to his song of the rolling earth, "the true 
word of immortality," but only because the Word as such, the Wordier 
se, is death. For it is by virtue of death, of course, that we may enjoy im 
mortality. In fact, if I may take a phrase out of context (specifically, 
"When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd"), it is fair to say that the 
song of the rolling earth, in all its versions, is itself "death's outlet song of 
life." It is by virtue of death that we have existence in any form, mortal as 
well as immortal. And it is existence in form that constitutes reality, mo 
tion realized in reflection. In E, for instance, equalling MC2. 
Reality then is a creation of consciousness and language, which are 
functions of one another and which, taken together, are functions of 
death. For they constitute that rage for order that only death could beget. 
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We crave reality because of death, and our craving is finally satisfied by 
death. It would seem therefore that Leaves of Grass's true word is death, 
which includes all. 
But as it turns out, Whitman knows exactly what he is talking about, 
even though poets are not supposed to. He knows that not only does the 
conditional require the absolute, but that the absolute requires the condi 
tional. Without death there could be no body, but it works the other way 
too: without the body there could be no death. By the same principle, 
without mere names there could be no true words, without flesh no soul. 
Hence his soul and he loving incorporate in verse to sing the body's 
praises. For the body?a temporary conformation of flesh, some arbitrary 
symbols arranged on paper, sounds pronounced in thin air, a material ap 
pearance for the nonce ?the body miraculously includes all, including 
death and the Me Myself's undying life. 
How lucky can we get? 
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